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Introduction
Most scientists would agree that if dramatic future climate changes are to be avoided, there must be a significant reduction in worldwide greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared with the "business as usual" (BAU) development of emissions. If all of these reductions were to take place only through existing technologies, costs of reducing GHG emissions may become very high. Due to increasing abatement costs, technological development will most likely play an important role in curbing growth in emissions. It is therefore important to incorporate factors influencing technological change in climate policy analyses.
During the last decade, several articles have studied interactions between endogenous technological change and environmental policy, see e.g. Jaffe et al. (2002) and Löschel (2002) for overviews. Several of these studies are particularly relevant for issues related to climate policy. However, many of these disregard interactions between countries, and simply consider the world as one unit with a central planner 1 .
The present paper focuses explicitly on interactions between countries, and is in this respect related to the studies by e.g. Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994) , Xepapadeas (1995) , Katsoulacos (1997) , Buonanno et al. (2000a Buonanno et al. ( ,2001 ), Rosendahl (2002) .
In our study there are two types of interactions. Firstly, R&D efforts in one country, which raise the technology level of the country, are also beneficial for other countries through technology spillovers. This feature of our model is shared by the studies referred to above 2 . Secondly, increased emissions of GHG in one country are harmful also for other countries.
With two types of externalities -positive externalities due to technology spillovers and negative environmental externalities of GHG emissions -standard economic theory suggests that two instruments should be used in order to reach the social optimum. While GHG emissions can be controlled efficiently through e.g. carbon taxes or tradable permits, there is virtually measure that (directly) correct for technology spillovers between countries.
The lack of an instrument reflects that the magnitude of R&D expenditures in a country is difficult to verify by other countries. If a country is required -through an international agreement -to ha ve more R&D expenditures than what is individually rational for the country, it will be relatively easy for the country to have less R&D than required by the agreement, but to report other expenditures as R&D activities.
The purpose of the present paper is therefore to study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, but there is no instrument to correct for these externalities. In particular, we compare the properties of different international climate agreements when the positive externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement.
None of the studies referred to above have the same focus as ours. The focus of Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994) and Xepapadeas (1995) is a comparison of the non-cooperative equilibrium with the first best optimum. However, none of these studies demonstrate that the non-cooperative equilibrium depends on what policy instruments countries use to reduce emissions. This is a topic discussed in Section 3 of our paper. Buonanno et al. (2001) make a simulation study calculating the costs of the Kyoto agreement under various assumptions about technological development, while Buonanno et al. (2000a,b) analyze the effects of restricting free trade of quotas under the same type of agreement. Similar analyses have been done by Millok (2000) and Kemfert (2001) . None of these studies compare a Kyoto type of agreement with an agreement that specifies policies (in stead of emissions) for each country. This is a topic discussed in Section 4 of our paper.
In our analysis, each country is faced by three types of costs; R&D expenditures, abatement costs and environmental costs, the latter being dependent on the sum of emissions from all countries. Each country seeks to minimize the sum of these costs.
While R&D investments are costly, increased R&D improves the technology of the country and lowers abatement costs (both absolute and marginal abatement costs at any given level of abatement). Improved technology also lowers BAU emissions of the country. A country can also reduce its emissions -and hence its environmental costs -directly through abatement, which is defined as costly activities that reduce emissions using known technologies.
Throughout the paper we assume that in each country R&D expenditures are controlled directly by the government. This could be interpreted as follows: Due to technology spillovers -both between countries and between domestic firms -the incentives for any particular firm for undertaking R&D expenditures are very weak.
The government must therefore finance the R&D activities, even though R&D (primarily) takes place in private firms. The government thus controls R&D expenditures through its funding of them, and hence in the analyses R&D expenditures are determined in a non-cooperative manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model in more detail and derive the social optimum. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we use a static framework, thus ignoring, for example, the fact that GHG emissions are stock pollutants. Moreover, all types of uncertainties -like rate of return on R&D investments -are disregarded. Finally, to keep formulations simple we only consider one type of GHG, namely CO 2 . None of our results are affected by the latter simplification.
The case of no international agreement is studied in Section 3. Without an agreement, in each country abatement, as well as R&D expenditures, are determined noncooperatively. Obviously, given the nature of the two inter-country externalities, a non-cooperative equilibrium will have too much emissions and too little R&D expenditures compared with the social optimum. We also find that the noncooperative equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or a carbon tax as their domestic instrument for controlling emissions. However, all countries are better off in the tax case than in the quota case. In Section 3.3 we demonstrate that if the type policy instrument and the magnitude of the instrument (i.e. the amount of quotas or the rate of the carbon tax) are chosen simultaneously, there are multiple Nash equilibria. If, however, the game runs over two-stages where each country chooses its instrument in the first stage, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium i s for all countries to use a carbon tax to control CO 2 emissions.
In Section 4 we turn to the case of international climate agreements with full participation. Although there are positive externalities from R&D expenditures, we assume that such expenditures are not regulated through the climate agreement, and are thus determined non-cooperatively (see discussion above). We consider two types of international agreements. One is a Kyoto type of agreement, i.e. an agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas.
Moreover, countries decide themselves how to implement the appropriate emissions domestically. The second type of climate agreement dictates that a common policy should be used domestically in all countries. In our simple model this policy is a carbon tax set at a common level.
Section 4.3 gives a comparison of these two types of agreements. Not surprisingly, none of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the total number of quotas is set so that the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level (the sum of marginal environmental costs), R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the Kyoto case, whereas R&D expenditures could even be too high with a harmonized domestic carbon tax.
In Section 5 we examine the case in which there is an incomplete agreement, i.e. some countries have not signed the agreement (the non-cooperating countries). If there is no abatement in the non-cooperating countries, there is virtually no difference between this case and the case of full cooperation. Hence, R&D expenditures will differ from the first best optimum for the cooperating countries, and for sure be too low when the signatories use tradable permits.
Next we study the case in which the cooperating countries can purchase CDM ("Clean Development Mechanism") quotas from the non-cooperating countries. The price of CDM quotas is assumed equal to the marginal abatement cost in the noncoopering countries. Increased R&D in the cooperating countries will then through technology spillovers (to the non-signatories) lower the price of CDM quotas, as a higher technology level lowers marginal costs of abatement (per assumption). On the other hand, increased purchase of CDM quotas will raise the quota price. This mechanism is taken into account in the first best optimum for the group of cooperating countries. Hence, in order to keep the price of CDM quotas low, the group of cooperating countries acts as a monopsonist towards the non-cooperating countries and purchase less CDM quotas, that is, less abatement in the noncooperative countries than full cost-effectiveness would suggest.
Comparing the first best optimum of the group of cooperating countries with the case of an incomplete Kyoto type of agreement with CDM quotas, as before the Kyoto type is inferior, having too low technology levels. The reasons are similar to the case of full participation in the climate agreement. In fact, in the present case there is even a further source of distortion: A cooperating country takes the price of CDM quotas as given (provided the country is "small"), and therefore neglects the beneficial effect of its R&D expenditures on the price of CDM quotas. Section 6 sums up our main findings and point at some extensions.
The basic model and the social optimum
According to Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) 
This way of modelling international knowledge spillovers is very similar to the approach used in the literature referred to above. The assumptions used by Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994) and Xepapadeas (1995) correspond to the limiting case of 1 γ = , while the assumptions used by e.g. Buonanno et al. (2000a Buonanno et al. ( ,b, 2001 ) and Rosendahl 
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The first order conditions for this problem are given by 4 :
According to (4) at the margin increased costs of R&D in a country (1) should be balanced against its total benefits. These benefits are of two kinds. First, increased R&D investments in a country reduce abatement costs for the country ( 
No international agreement
In this section we assume that there is no international agreement. Instead, each country determines investments in R&D and abatement by balancing costs against benefits following from reduced emissions of CO 2 . While investments in R&D are controlled by the government and thus determined directly, the government does not control abatement directly. Instead, domestic measures are imposed in order to achieve the desired level of abatement. We assume that the countries collectively decide on type of domestic instrument for controlling emissions, and that all countries are committed to this choice.
In Section 3.1 we study the case in which each country is committed to use domestic tradable emission quotas to reach its desired abatement level. The second case we study (Section 3.2) is the one in which each country is committed to use a domestic carbon tax. In this case the policy variable is thus not the sum of domestic emissions, but a domestic tax that, along with the level of technology, determines abatement. In both cases we find the Nash equilibrium, assuming that all decisions are taken simultaneously, and that each country minimises its total costs. Finally, multiple Nash equilibria are discussed in Section 3.3.
Domestic tradable quotas as the chosen policy instrument
Assume that the government in each country makes a simultaneous decision about the level of the country's R&D expenditures and the country's total emissions. This total emission level is thereafter distributed to the private agents of the economy through tradable permits. The game considered in this section is thus a game in which country i chooses its emissions and its R&D expenditures to minimize
taking emission levels and R&D expenditures in other countries as given. The first order conditions to this minimization problem can be written as
Relations (7) and (8) 
A carbon tax as the chosen policy instrument
We now assume that the government in each country uses a domestic tax i τ in order to control domestic abatement. The government in each country makes a simultaneous decision about the level of the country's R&D expenditures and the country's total emissions. Once all R&D expenditures and tax rates are determined, private agents in each country will then choose emissions so that marginal costs of abatement are equal to the tax:
From (9) we find that abatement in a country depends on the tax imposed in the country and the technology level of the country:
where our assumptions of the abatement cost function imply that
When governments control abatement through a domestic t ax, the government chooses the tax and R&D expenditures to minimize
The first order conditions are now given by (8) and
Using (8), this equation may be rewritten as
Comparing this with the social optimum given by (4) and (5) 
A comparison of the two non-cooperative equilibria
We wish to compare the two types of non-cooperative equilibria, which we denote the quota equilibrium (section 3.1) and the tax equilibrium (section 3.2). Condition (8) is valid in both equilibria. However, the conditions for optimal R&D differ: Comparing (13) with (7), we see that (13) has an additional positive term (
compared with (7). The interpretation of this term is that when tax rates in all countries are given, increased R&D investment in a country will reduce emission levels in other countries because of technological diffusion. This additional term implies that the marginal benefits of R&D investments for each country increase, and hence the incentives for R&D expenditures increase. Since BAU emissions and abatement costs are lower the higher are R&D expenditures, we therefore expect emissions to be lower under the tax equilibrium than under the quota equilibrium. In the Appendix we prove that this intuition turns out to hold, i.e., we have the following result:
Proposition 1: Total emissions are lower in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium than in the non-cooperative quota equilibrium.
Although total emissions are lower in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium than in the non-cooperative quota equilibrium, this does not necessarily imply that R&D expenditures in all countries are higher in the t ax equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium. In the Appendix 1 we prove the following slightly weaker result: D is zero when the sum of emissions is below some threshold E*, and positive when the sum of emissions exceeds E*. From Proposition 2 we know that emissions in all other countries are lower in the tax equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium. Assume therefore that the sum of emissions from countries 2,..,m exceeds E* in the quota equilibrium, but are lower than E* in the tax equilibrium. Country 1 will therefore have positive abatement in the quota equilibrium, but zero abatement in the tax equilibrium.
5 For this case it is thus not true that all countries have higher abatement levels in the tax equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium.
Notice that although technology levels are higher in all countries with linear environmental damage functions in the tax equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium, we cannot conclude that R&D expenditures are higher in these countries in the tax equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium. This can be seen by considering the 2-country case. For this case it follows from (1) as we move from the quota to the tax equilibrium, R&D expenditures in county 1 will be lower in the tax equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium. Proof: This follows directly from the fact that with identical countries each country has more R&D investment and lower emissions in the tax equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium. As for the country's own policy, in both cases R&D expenditure and abatement are chosen (directly or indirectly through an appropriate carbon tax) in order to maximize the country's own welfare. Any particular country is cet. par. better off the higher are the levels of R&D investments and abatement in other countries. A country is thus better off when other countries use taxes than when other countries use quotas. 6 QED
Endogenous type of policy
In Section 3.1 we studied the corne r case in which all countries use domestic tradable quotas in order to reach the equilibrium emission level. Likewise, in Section 3.2 we examined the corner case in which all countries use a carbon tax as their domestic instrument. There are, however, more equilibria. First, note that given the choice of domestic policy instrument in the other countries, for the last country there is a particular abatement level and level of R&D investments that maximize the country's welfare. These levels will of course depend on what other countries do, and in 6 A country could (hypothetically) choose R&D investment and abatement level from the quota equilibrium even if other countries use taxes. It would then be better off than if other countries had used quotas (and thus had higher emissions and less R&D). Of course, the country is even better off when it chooses R&D and abatement according to the tax equilibrium (given that all other countries use taxes).
particular on how many countries use quotas and how many countries use taxes. But whatever the optimal level of R&D investments and abatement are in a country, it makes no difference to the country's welfare whether the appropriate abatement level is achieved through the use of quotas or through an appropriate carbon tax. Hence, the two Nash equilibria discussed above are only two of many possible Nash equilibria.
The discussion above demonstrates the following proposition: Notice that the assumption of identical countries in the above Proposition was needed only to guarantee that each country has more R&D investment and lower emissions the larger is the number of other countries choosing a tax as their policy instrument.
This will hold if countries are identical, but it will obviously also hold under much weaker assumptions. Proposition 6 can thus be generalized to a broader set of cases than the case of identical countries.
International agreements
We consider two types of complete international climate agreements. The first type of agreement is a Kyoto type. This agreement specifies the initial distribution of emission quotas between countries, but allows countries to buy or sell quotas from/to other countries. The agreement imposes no restrictions on how a country sets its domestic policy, as long as its emissions does not exceed its quotas (i.e. initial endowment adjusted for quotas purchased or sold).
The second type of agreement does not set any direct limits on the emissions of the countries. Instead, the agreement specifies policy instruments that the countries must implement domestically. Below, we study the case where there is a common domestic carbon tax that all countries must implement.
In the simple case where R&D investments for a moment are ignored, both types of agreements will in principle give cost-effectiveness, as marginal abatement costs will be equalized across countries in both cases. 7 Moreover, with a suitable amount of total quotas or a suitable level of the common carbon tax, the condition (5) for efficient abatement can be met.
Internationally tradable emission quotas
Assume that country i is given initial emission quotas equal to i E . Moreover, assume that a competitive international market for quotas is established, with an equilibrium price p for quotas. Obviously, this price will be higher the smaller is the sum of quotas
Assume that all countries are small, in the sense that they consider the 7 There are obviously several qualifications. In particular, for the Kyoto type agreement we must assume that no country has market power (see e.g. Westskog, 1996) and that domestic policies are efficient in the sense that the costs to a country of emitting CO 2 (equal to the international quota price) are passed on to private agents. With a harmonized carbon tax, we must assume that domestic policy is not designed so that the effect of the tax is undermined, see e.g. Hoel (1992a,b; 1993) for a further discussion. quota price as independent of their own decisions. We shall discuss this further in the end of this section. For a given quota endowment i E and a given quota p, country i
subject to (1) and taking R&D expenditures in other countries as given (that is, R&D expenditures are determined in a non-cooperative manner). Notice that the environmental cost function D i does not appear here, since the sum of emissions are given.
The first order conditions for this minimization problem are
and
The equilibrium price p will of course depend on the sum of quotas E . The lower E is, the higher will be the quota price. Moreover, in Appendix 1 we show the following
Proposition 7: The higher the quota price p, the higher is abatement and the higher is the technology level in all countries.
If the sum of quotas is set so that the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, i.e.
equal to the sum of marginal environmental costs ' j j D ∑ , it is clear that equation (5) from the social optimum will be satisfied. However, the conditions for R&D expenditures differ: Comparing (15) with (4), we see that (4) Although a total emission level implying ' j j pD = ∑ may seem as a natural choice, it is in fact better to have a lower sum of emissions. To see this, start with an emission level implying ' j j pD = ∑ , and then reduce the sum of emissions. This will give an increase in the quota price p. From Proposition 7 we know that the increase in p will imply increased abatement and technology levels. Small changes in abatement levels have a second order effect on total social costs, since (5) holds initially. However, when the initial equilibrium is given by (15), it is shown in Appendix 1 (by differentiating (3) that social costs are reduced by small changes in R&D expenditures that increase all technology levels. We thus have the following result:
Proposition 9: Under a Kyoto type of agreement, the optimal amount of quotas is such that the equilibrium quota price is higher than the Pigovian level
From the discussion above it follows that under a Kyoto type of agreement, the quota price should be "high", that is, the amount of quotas should be "low", in order to adjust for insufficient incentives for the signatories to take technology spillovers into account.
We have so far assumed that all countries consider the quota price as given. For a country that is so large that it takes into consideration that its decisions influence this price we get additional terms in (15) will depend on how many quotas large countries buy or sell. In particular, these terms will be zero if the initial quota allocation implies that the large countries decide to neither buy nor sell quotas. Notice that this will be the outcome if all countries are identical and the quotas are distributed equally to all countries.
A harmonized domestic carbon tax
Assume now that the climate agreement does not specify emission levels for the participating countries, but instead requires all countries to introduce a common domestic carbon tax t. Moreover, in each country the carbon tax revenue of the government is redistributed domestically. For country i, the abatement level is now determined by (10), with t i replaced by t.
Country i minimizes ((,),)([()(,)])
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subject to (1). The optimal choice of R&D expenditures is given by the first order condition (12), which together with (9) may be rewritten as
The two first terms on the r.h.s. of (18) D , see (8). However, with an agreement (the present case) the common tax rate τ will in general differ from (be higher than) the tax rate the country would have chosen without any agreement, that is, the last term in (18) is negative. The interpretation is that the larger are R&D expenditures, the larger is abatement, i.e. the more is abatement distorted away from the country's ideal choice (given by (8)). This negative consequence of more R&D expenditure must be subtracted from the positive effects given by the first two terms.
If the common carbon tax is set at the Piguvian level, i.e. equal to the sum of marginal environmental costs ' j j D ∑ , it is clear from (9) that equation (5) from the social optimum will be satisfied. However, also in the present case the R&D expenditures will generally differ from the socially optimal level, but it is now not obvious whether there will be too little R&D compared with the social optimum (as in the case considered in the previous section), or too much R&D. To see this compare (4) and (18) D . This tends to make the r.h.s. of (18) smaller than the r.h.s. of (4).
• The term
It is not clear which of these terms is largest.
• In (18) there is a negative term '' () iiy DA τ −− that dose not appear in (4). This tends to make the r.h.s. of (18) smaller than the r.h.s. of (4).
From the reasoning above it is clear that we cannot be sure whether (4) or (18) (4) and (18) differ for some or all countries, as they generally will, this will usually no longer be true. We can summarize this discussion in the following Proposition: 
A comparison of the two types of agreements
In this section we compare the two types of international agreements, which also may be labelled "quota" and "tax" types of agreements. We have not been able to make a With the notation above we can rewrite (15) and (18) If the price of carbon is sufficiently lower than the Pigovian level, the result above will be reversed. This confirms our analysis in Section 3, where we showed that without international cooperation, quotas would give lower R&D expenditures and higher emissions than taxes (for identical countries). Formally, this follows from (20) with p=d, which corresponds to the case of no agreement. With p=d, we get 
Incomplete agreeme nts
The Kyoto agreement will only cover some of the countries in the world. This is likely to be the case for any international agreement: There may always be some countries not being willing to sign the agreement. In this chapter we therefore assume that there is an aggregate of such countries, which we denote by country 0, in addition to the N (signatory) countries of our model. The purpose of this chapter is to see how the existence of such an outside country (in reality a group of countries) affects the optimal choice of policies in the cooperating countries.
No explicit abatement in the non-cooperating country
Assume first that there is no active abatement effort in the non-cooperating countries, which may reflect that these countries do not regard the climate problem to be of any significance to it. This could also be the reason why the countries are not interested in joining an international agreement that aims at reducing CO 2 emissions.
Even if there is no abatement effort in the non-cooperating countries, the BAU emission level N 0 could depend on R&D expenditures in the cooperating countries. We have thus implicitly assumed that there are no R&D expenditures (of the kind relevant for CO 2 emissions) in the non-cooperating countries. This is a reasonable description of countries that are not concerned about the environmental effect of CO 2 emissions.
For the cooperating countries, total social costs are given by (3) as before, the only difference being that there is an additional term -00 () Ny -in the environmental damage functions. The social optimum is as before given by (4) and (5), but with the summation operator in the second term of (4) starting at 0 instead of 1.
Next, consider an international agreement of the quota type, i.e. the type discussed in Section 4.1. Since total emissions are no longer given (incomplete agreement), we must include environmental costs in the expressio n for total costs of country i. Instead of (14) we therefore now have 
where y 0 is given by (21). The first order conditions for the minimization of this expression give us (16) as before, and instead of (15) we get
The additional positive term '' 0 i ND − on the r.h.s. of (23) implies that there are higher R&D expenditures in the present case than in the case without non-cooperating countries. However the underinvestment in R&D is no less than before, as the existence of non-cooperating countries also augments the r.h.s. of (4) Turning to the tax type of agreement discussed in Section 4.2, the only change in the minimization problem of a country is that the summation operator in (17) starts at 0 instead of 1, and A 0 =0. The first order condition for this problem is given by (18) as before, but with the first summation operator starting at 0 instead of 1.
It is thus clear that for both types of agreement, the only change due to noncooperating countries is the addition of the term
on the r.h.s. of the equations describing the optimal amount of R&D expenditure. The comparison between the two types of agreements, given in Section 4.3, thus remains valid also in the present case.
A quota agreement with a CDM
Consider the case in which the cooperating countries can induce the non-cooperating countries to abate its emissions. Decreased emissions in the non-cooperating countries require transfer of money from the cooperating countries to the non-cooperating countries, that is, the signatories buy CDM ("Clean Development Mechanism") quotas from the non-cooperating countries. We assume that the price of CDM quotas Consider the first best optimum for the group of cooperating countries when the price for CDM quotas is equal to the marginal abatement cost in the non-cooperating countries. Formally, this optimum is found by minimizing (25) subject to the constraints (1), (21) 
Except for the differences with respect to which countries the summation operator includes, (26) and (27) Equation (28) suggests the optimal amount of purchased CDM quotas for the group of cooperating countries. Since '' 00 0 AA AC > , it follows from (27) and (28) that marginal abatement costs should be lower in the non-cooperating countries than in the cooperating countries. The reason is that it is optimal for the group of cooperating countries to act as a monopsonist towards the non-cooperating countries. By purchasing less abatement in the non-cooperating countries than full costeffectiveness would suggest, the price of CDM quotas (equal to marginal costs of abatement in the non-cooperating countries) is kept down.
We now turn to the case of a Kyoto type of agreement with incomplete participation.
As in Section 4.1 R&D expenditures are determined by the signatories in a noncooperative manner. Let a 0i be the amount of abatement in the non-cooperating 
Country i takes the prices p and q as given, and wishes to choose x i , A i and a 0i in order to minimize its total costs. If q<p all countries want to purchase only CDM quotas.
However, with no demand for tradable quotas, the price of this type of quota drops, and in equilibrium q=p. On the other hand, if 0 A is given and "low", q<p in equilibrium. Note that in order to sustain q<p in equilibrium, the amount 0 A must be rationed, that is, the agreement must specify for each cooperating country how much abatement it is allowed to purchase in the non-cooperating countries.
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For an exogenous a 0i , the levels of x i and A i that minimize the expression above are given by (16) and (23). Comparing these equations with the conditions for a first best optimum for the group of cooperating countries, i.e. with (26) and (27), we see that if the sum of quotas is set so that the quota price i s equal to the Pigovian level (i.e.
' j j pD = ∑ ), it is clear that equation (27) from the first best optimum of the signatories will be satisfied. However, the technology levels in the cooperating countries will also in the present case be lower than what is optimal, as the reasoning we gave after (16) is valid also in the present case. In fact, in the present case there is even a further distortion, which is due to the last term on the r.h.s. of (26): Individual countries take the price q as given, and therefore neglect the price lowering effect of their R&D expenditures. The discussion above implies that for the same reason as given in Section 4.1, it is also in the present case optimal to set the sum of emissions so low that the quota price p is higher than the Pigovian level.
The main results of this section can be summarized as follows: 
Concluding remarks
We we would like to make a few concluding remarks. First, several of our results were proved under rather restrictive assumptions, such as identical countries and/or specific properties of the environmental damage functions. However, by considering the discussions and the proofs, it is clear that these restrictive assumptions are only necessary conditions. The results are thus likely to hold for a much wider class of assumptions, although they are not completely general.
Second, we would like to point out an important policy implication of one of our results. It is sometimes argued that since we can expect lower abatement costs in the future through technological change, current restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions should be moderate. Our analysis has shown that if future technological change is the result of deliberate R&D effort, this argument may be misleading: Under a Kyoto type of agreement, Proposition 9 suggests that the total amount of quotas should be so strict that the price of emission is higher than what would have been optimal in the absence of endogenous technological change.
Finally, there are a number of possible extensions of the present paper. The most obvious might be the modelling of R&D: In the paper we have assumed that in each country R&D expenditures are controlled directly by the government. A more adequate modelling would have been to let the government determine policy instruments, for example, R&D subsidies, that have impacts on firm's decisions on R&D expenditures. Within such a framework we could study how policy instruments affect technology spillovers both between firms in the same countries, and between firms in different countries. In addition, the rate of technological diffusion (γ ) could be endogenous and related to firm characteristics, e.g. level of technology. Hence, a topic for future research could be the interplay between policy instruments of different countries, firm incentives to undertake R&D investments and the rate of technological diffusion.
APPENDIX 1: Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and Remark 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume the opposite, i.e. that E T ³ E Q (using superscripts T and Q to denote the tax and quota equilibrium, respectively, and letting E denote total emissions). From the convexity of the environmental damage functions this implies
Since the terms Differentiating (A1) and (A2) yields:
As noted above, a shift from the quota equilibrium to the tax equilibrium implies that 
while the condition (7) for the quota equilibrium and (13) for the quota equilibrium may be written as
where K i =0 in the quota equilibrium and 
and the signs follow from our assumptions on the abatement cost functions and BAU emission functions. It is thus clear that technology levels and abatement levels are higher in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium than in the non-cooperative quota equilibrium. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 7
Differentiating (15) and (16) 
Proof of Proposition 9
Denote social costs (given by (3)) by S. Differentiating the first line of (3) with respect to technology levels gives
where we have inserted The term in square brackets is larger than 1. The sum of technology levels is thus proportional to the sum of R&D expenditures, with a proportionality factor that is larger than one. When Note that (A17) and (A18) have the same mathematical structure as (A6) and (A7).
From (A8) and (A9) it therefore follows that
and Remark 1 immediately follows. 
